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 INTRODUCTION
The definition of disease is not as straightforward as 
it may seem. The combination of signs and symptoms, 
together with interpretation of the results of confirma-
tory ancillary tests, allows us to have a probabilistic 
estimate of disease but we can never be absolutely sure 
that a non -ambiguous clinical entity is in play.
This is because of the clinical uncertainty of biological 
phenomena, which makes the interpretation of the com-
ponents of a clinical history so difficult: a present symp-
tom can be typical of a disease that the patient in fact 
does not have (a false positive) or is absent in a disease 
that the patient indeed has (a false negative). Irrespec-
tive of the diagnostic characteristics of a test (or a symp-
tom, or a sign) – its sensitivity and specificity, its likeli-
hood ratios – there exists no test that can discriminate 
100% of the time between disease and its absence.
Another problem is, of course, the definition of 
“normal”.
It would be nice if the frequency of all the data col-
lected on a patient or a healthy person were distributed 
in a such a way that would allow us to differentiate 
between normal and abnormal every time. But of 
course this is not the case (except for some genetic 
conditions), because diseases are progressive with 
smooth evolution from low to high values (in nephrol-
ogy, the paradigmatic case is creatinine measurement 
to detect chronic kidney insufficiency) and the frequen-
cies almost always overlap between both groups1.
What criteria should then be used to divide normal 
from abnormal?
Classically there are three criteria that have proven 
useful:
1.  Abnormal equals being unusual. This is a statistical 
definition: for example, by convention, we call abnor-
mal all values beyond 2 standard deviations from the 
mean of the average values of a test, gathered in a 
sample of non -diseased people. One immediate con-
sequence is that, assuming a normal (bell -shaped) 
distribution, 2.5% of the findings are considered 
abnormal, but in fact there is no disease present (the 
findings came from a normal individual).
2.  Abnormal equals being ill. Distinguishing normal 
from disease means that we consider abnormal 
all observations that are associated with a risk of 
having, or developing, some disease, or increase 
the possibility of dying.
3.  Abnormal equals being treatable. Here we say that 
abnormality is present when treatment leads to a 
better clinical outcome (note that not every condi-
tion conferring an increased risk can be successfully 
treated). This makes intuitive sense, especially for 
asymptomatic pathologies (where we should not 
treat a condition that is causing no problems), but 
even in symptomatic patients it may be worth paus-
ing before treating when we are faced with a situa-
tion in which we do not know how to interpret the 
clinical findings. For example, with the new, more 
powerful, imaging techniques at our disposal we are 
detecting things which are hard to interpret as being 
(or not) a cause of our patient’s symptoms.
Having defined some fairly good basis for abnormal-
ity – and this is just a simple approach; there is much 
more to it – we can now turn to the problem of 
overdiagnosis.
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 OVERDIAGNOSIS
The definition of overdiagnosis can be found in a paper 
from Moynihan et al.: “…overdiagnosis happens when 
a diagnostic label is applied to people with mild symp-
toms or at very low risk of future illness, for whom the 
label and subsequent treatment may do more harm than 
good2.” This means that overdiagnosis medicalizes more 
people and therefore induces overtreatment i.e. unnec-
essary interventions that do more harm than good.
There are several causes and drivers of overdiagno-
sis3,4: increased sensitive biomarker testing, technologi-
cal changes detecting smaller and smaller abnormali-
ties, commercial and professional interests, potential 
legal punishment for missing the diagnosis (but not 
overdiagnosis), health system model of business (more 
tests and treatments bring in more income), cultural 
beliefs in preventive measures (faith in early detection) 
and a tenet for good clinical practice being “more is 
better”. However, the most important factor is changing 
disease and treatment thresholds by expert panels 
producing expanded disease definitions (the number 
one criteria above).
The modulating of threshold levels of laboratory or 
imaging tests can significantly modify the prevalence 
of disease. One classical example is the ever -changing 
reference values in clinical practice guidelines (CPG), 
based on more or less clear evidence of the benefit of 
lowering thresholds for initiating treatment. In so doing, 
experts from the CPG committees suddenly change the 
absolute number – and therefore the prevalence – of 
the subjects considered at risk. One consequence is 
that all of a sudden there is now an all -new group of 
patients eligible for treatment.
The tendency to reduce the diagnostic threshold has 
been prevalent in many diseases. Looking at some 
prevalent risk factors and diseases we can appreciate 
the problem:
1.  Diabetes. For many years the diagnostic value for 
diabetes mellitus was a fasting blood glucose of 
140 mg/dL. But in 1997 the American Expert Com-
mittee on the Diagnosis and Classification of Dia-
betes Mellitus decided to lower this value to 126 
mg/dL. In so doing, almost two million people 
became diabetic literally overnight.
2.  Hypertension. For a long time, there was no rec-
ommendation to treat mild hypertension without 
target organ damage. However, in 1997 (definitely 
a bad year!) the Joint National Committee on Pre-
vention, Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of 
High Blood Pressure advocated the treatment of 
these patients, regardless of their baseline car-
diovascular risk5, labelling almost 14 million 
patients as new cases of hypertension.
3.  Hyperlipidaemia. The classical approach was to 
treat total cholesterol above 300 mg/dL. This value 
has been steadily decreasing as the basis for drug 
intervention, especially after the publication of 
the AFCAPS/TexCAPS trial which defined a target 
value of 240 mg/dL, based on an absolute risk 
reduction of 2% (meaning that out of 100 patients 
subjected to therapy two would benefit but 98 
would not)6. When the value was once again later 
reduced to 200 mg/dL, almost 43 million patients 
were suddenly eligible to take a statin (an increase 
in prevalence of 86% in a single shot!).
4.  Osteoporosis. Bone mineral density testing, 
through comparisons with young healthy women, 
produces a T -score defined as abnormal by the 
Table
The effect of lowering diagnostic thresholds
CONDITION
Change in the lab  
or imaging threshold value
Disease prevalence
Old definition New definition Number of new cases Absolute increase
DIABETES
Fasting blood sugar: 140 to 126 mg/dL
11 697 000 13 378 000 1 681 000 14%
HYPERTENSION
Systolic BP: 160 to 140 mmHg
Diastolic BP: 100 to 90 mmHg
38 690 000 52 180 000 13 490 000 35%
HYPERLIPIDAEMIA
Total cholesterol: 240 to 200 mg/dl
49 480 000 92 127 000 42 647 000 86%
OSTEOPOROSIS
T ‑Score  ‑2.5 to  ‑2.0
8 010 000 14 791 000 6 781 000 85%
Adapted from8.
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WHO when its value is below 2.5. When the 
American National Osteoporosis Foundation sug-
gested lowering the T -score to less than  -2.0, 
almost 7 million American women “developed” 
osteoporosis7.
In the table below we can see the effect of lowering 
these diagnostic thresholds in terms of increased dis-
ease prevalence.
Of course this problem is not exclusive of laboratory 
data. For example, between 1975 and 2012 the inci-
dence of thyroid cancer tripled, but the death rate did 
not change. This rise is best explained by increased 
imaging testing with better definition than by a real 
change in cancer incidence9,10.
  OVERDIAGNOSING CHRONIC KIDNEY 
DISEASE
Is nephrology free of this problem?
Not really.
In a recent paper, Moynihan et al. commented on 
the 2012 definitions (updated from 2002) of chronic 
kidney disease. Based largely on laboratory measure-
ments of kidney function and the belief that Identifying 
chronic kidney disease early slows progression towards 
kidney failure, the new definition labelled 1 in 8 adults 
(around 14%) as having chronic kidney disease. Before 
2002 the prevalence in the US was not well defined 
due to lack of a consistent definition but one study 
suggested a figure of 1.7% of the population. If this 
increase in prevalence to 12.3% is false, then we have 
a problem that many of those diagnosed will never 
progress to symptomatic forms of kidney disease, but 
will have the psychological effect of a disease label and 
the burden and costs of repeated evaluation, testing 
and potentially unnecessary treatment. The authors 
conclude by saying that“…Clinicians should be sceptical 
about the current definition of chronic kidney disease 
and cautious about labelling patients, particularly older 
people.”11
 CONCLUSIONS
In all medical specialties, overdiagnosis is a problem 
worth tackling. One should be very careful to not harm 
people who effectively have no disease.
To do this we must be alert to the possibility of over-
diagnosis, for example when incidence increases while 
mortality stays the same, the shifting in diagnostic 
definitions or thresholds with no evidence that benefits 
are greater than harms and labelling of a risk factor or 
biomarker to sound like a disease.12
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